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Who has benefited financially from investment treaty arbitration? 
An evaluation of the size and wealth of claimants 
 
Gus Van Harten and Pavel Malysheuski 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
 
I. Introduction 
 
The sociological legitimacy of investment treaty arbitration, commonly known as 
investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS), appears to depend in part on an expectation 
that it benefits smaller businesses, not just large multinationals and the super wealthy.1 
Proposed trade agreements that would expand greatly the role of ISDS – such as the 
U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Europe-U.S. Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP), and Canada-EU Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) – have been promoted as delivering benefits for smaller enterprises.2 
 
We examined the relationship between ISDS and smaller firms by collecting data on size 
and wealth of the foreign investors that have brought claims and received monetary 
awards due to ISDS. Our main findings are that the beneficiaries of ISDS-ordered 
financial transfers,3 in the aggregate, have overwhelmingly been companies with more 
than USD1 billion in annual revenue – especially extra-large companies with more than 
USD10 billion – and individuals who have over USD100 million in net wealth. ISDS has 
produced monetary benefits primarily for those companies or individuals at the expense 
of respondent states. 
 
Thus, we found that companies with over USD1 billion in annual revenue and individuals 
with over USD100 million in net wealth received about 94.5% of the aggregate 
compensation (93.5% if pre-award interest is included) ordered by first-instance ISDS 
tribunals. The remaining roughly 5.5% (or 6.5%) of the ordered compensation went to 
companies with less than USD1 billion in annual revenues, unknown companies, and 
                                                          
1
 Our use of the term sociological legitimacy draws on D. Behn, O.K. Fauchald, and M. Langford, “How to approach 
‘legitimacy’ for the book project Empirical Perspectives on the Legitimacy of International Investment Tribunals”, 
prepared for the August 2015 workshop of the University of Oslo’s Pluricourts Project. The comments from 
participants in the workshop are gratefully acknowledged. 
2
 S. Lynch, “EU-US trade deal will benefit SMEs, says Brussels” The Irish Times (21 April 2015); P. Parks, “Critics of 
Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal warn about arbitration clause”. See also Movement for Responsibility in Trade 
Agreements, “Five questions SME businesses need to ask themselves about TTIP”  
https://moreforsmesthanttip.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/fivequestionssmesneedtoaskthemselvesaboutttip-
final-23-22.pdf 
3
 We do not use the term “financial transfers” to describe ISDS orders of compensation to foreign investors in a 
negative way, as one participant in the Pluricourts Project workshop commented. Rather, we use the term in an 
effort to avoid conveying a negative or positive assessment of the legitimacy of such orders of compensation. 
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individuals whose net wealth appeared to be less than USD100 million. It was evident 
that ISDS has also delivered substantial monetary benefits for the ISDS legal industry. 
 
Incidentally, we also found that extra-large companies’ success rates in ISDS (70.8%), 
measured by simple win-loss outcomes at the jurisdictional and merits stages of an ISDS 
claim combined, exceeded by a large margin the success rates of other claimants 
(42.2%). Yet the success rates of large (as opposed to extra-large) companies (44.7%) 
and of super wealthy individuals (36.4%) at both of these stages combined was 
comparable to those of other claimants (not including large or extra-large companies or 
super wealthy individuals) (42.5%). The success rate of extra-large companies at the 
merits stage in particular (82.9%) stood out compared to that of all other claimants 
(57.9%). 
 
Our analysis is descriptive in that it does not seek to predict future outcomes and does 
not use more complex statistical tools. One should approach all of the numbers 
presented here as approximate and keep in mind that variations in the experiences of 
different actors may be coincidental. We suggest that the most useful findings are those 
indicating a wide variation in these experiences and those appearing to contradict less 
evidence-based claims in the field. 
 
II. Findings 
 
A. Ordered financial transfers by size or wealth of beneficiary 
 
It emerged from the analysis that ISDS – approached as a process that generates 
ordered financial transfers – has primarily benefited extra-large or large companies and 
super wealthy individuals. The great majority of ordered transfers, in the aggregate, 
have gone to such actors. Findings and data are outlined in the tables below. A more 
detailed breakdown of the dataset is appended to this paper. 
 
1. Aggregate ordered compensation 
 
Size or wealth 
of beneficiary 
Measure of size or 
wealth 
No. of cases 
where 
damages 
ordered 
Total awarded, 
raw sum 
% awarded, 
raw sum  
Total awarded, 
raw sum + pre-
award interest 
% awarded, 
raw sum + 
pre-award 
interest 
Extra-large 
company 
>$10 billion in 
annual revenue 
26 
 
5282 million  
 
73.5% 6718 million 
 
 
73.3% 
Large company >$1 billion and <$10 
billion in annual 
revenue 
14 601 million 8.4% 780 million  
 
 
8.5% 
Medium 
company 
>$100  million and 
<$1 billion in annual 
revenue  
4 13 million 
 
0.2% 17 million  
 
 
0.2% 
Small company <$100 million in 4 80 million 1.1% 99 million  1.1% 
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annual revenue  
 
 
 
Unknown 
company 
Data unavailable 
(DU) for annual 
revenue 
13 132 million  
 
1.8% 154 million 1.7% 
Super wealthy 
individual 
>$100 million in net 
wealth 
5 905 million 
 
12.6% 1072 million  
 
11.7% 
Other 
individual 
<$100 million in net 
wealth 
20 179 million 
 
2.5% 
 
325 million 3.5% 
 
2. Breakdown of cases 
 
Case 
 
Claimant 
nationality 
(with apparent 
forum shopping 
(FS) indicated) 
Corporation 
or natural 
person 
Claimant size or 
wealth 
Amount 
awarded 
Amount 
awarded + pre-
award interest 
      
Occidental v Ecuador No 2 USA C Extra-large 1770 million 2358 million 
Mobil v Venezuela Netherlands 
(FS: USA) 
C Extra-large 1600 million 2067 million 
      
EDF v Argentina Belgium, France C Extra-large 136 million 205 million 
BG Group v Argentina UK C Extra-large 185 million 219 million 
CMS v Argentina USA C Large 133 million 151 million 
CGE/ Vivendi v Argentina No 2 France C Extra-large 105 million 169 million 
Siemens v Argentina Germany C Extra-large 238 million 278 million 
Enron v Argentina USA C Extra-large 106 million 142 million 
Azurix v Argentina USA C Extra-large 165 million 186 million 
Sempra v Argentina USA C Large 128 million 171 million 
Suez & Interaguas France C Extra-large 405 million 405 million 
CME v Czech Republic Netherlands 
(FS: USA) 
N Super wealthy 
individual 
270 million 395 million 
Stati v Kazakhstan Moldova N Super wealthy 
individual 
498 million 498 million 
Rumeli v Kazakhstan Turkey (FS: UK 
for one of two 
claimants, split 
between two 
nationalities i.e. 
Turkey, UK) 
C Large (with 
Extra-large, 
count as Extra-
large) 
125 million 165 million 
Micula v Romania Sweden N Super wealthy 
individual 
117 million 156 million 
      
LG&E v Argentina USA C Extra-large 57 million 57 million 
Chevron v Ecuador No 1 USA C Extra-large 78 million 96 million 
Siag v Egypt Italy (FS: dual 
national of 
Egypt) 
N Other individual 75 million 129 million 
ADC v Hungary Cyprus (FS: data 
unavailable 
(DU)) 
C Unknown 76 million 76 million 
Cargill v Mexico USA C Extra-large 77 million 86 million 
Deutsche Bank v Sri Lanka Germany C Extra-large 60 million 70 million 
      
Impregilo v Argentina Italy C Large 21 million 28 million 
El Paso v Argentina USA C Extra-large 43 million 66 million 
National Grid v Argentina UK C Extra-large 39 million 54 million 
SAUR International v Argentina France C Large 40 million 60 million 
Guaracachi v Bolivia UK, USA C Small 29 million 36 million 
Pey Casado v Chile Spain N  Other individual 
(and non-profit 
10 million 14 million 
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org) 
Eastern Sugar v Costa Rica Netherlands 
(FS: UK and 
Germany) 
C Extra-large 35 million 35 million 
Occidental Petroleum v 
Ecuador No 1 
USA C Extra-large 72 million 75 million 
OKO Pankki Oyj v Estonia Finland C Extra-large 11 million 14 million 
Kardassapoulos v Georgia Greece N Other individual 15 million 45 million 
Fuchs v Georgia Israel N Other individual 15 million 45 million 
RDC v Guatemala USA N Super wealthy 
individual 
11 million 11 million 
TECO v Guatemala USA C Large 21 million 23 million 
Abengoa v Mexico Spain C Extra-large  40 million 42 million 
ADM v Mexico USA C Large 34 million 37 million 
Metalclad v Mexico USA (FS: DU) C Unknown 17 million 17 million 
SGS v Paraguay Switzerland C Large 39 million 64 million 
Achmea v Slovakia No 1 Netherlands C Extra-large 29 million (net 
any taxes) 
29 million (net 
any taxes) 
Walter Bau v Thailand Germany C Small 41 million 50 million 
Tidewater v Venezuela Barbados (FS: 
USA) 
C Large 46 million 60 million 
Desert Line Products v Yemen Oman N Other individual 25 million 30 million 
Funnekotter v Zim Netherlands N Other individual 11 million 25 million 
      
Continental Casualty v 
Argentina 
USA C Extra-large 2.8 million 3.6 million 
Saipem v Bangladesh Italy C Extra-large 6.3 million 11 million 
Goetz v Burundi No 1 Belgium N Other individual 3 million 3 million 
Goetz v Burundi No 2 Belgium N Other individual 1.2 million 2.2 million 
SD Myers v Canada USA C Medium 6 million 8.3 million 
MTD Equity v Chile Malaysia C Medium 5.9 million 7.4 million 
American Manufacturing v 
Congo 
USA (FS: DU) C Unknown 9 million 9 million 
Reinhard Unglaube v Costa Rica Germany N Other individual 3.1 million 4.1 million 
Duke Energy v Ecuador USA C Extra-large 5.6 million 28 million 
Middle East Cement v Egypt Greece (FS: DU) C Unknown 2.2 million 3.8 million 
Wena Hotels v Egypt UK (FS: DU) C Unknown 8.8 million 19 million 
White Industries v India Australia (FS: 
DU) 
C Unknown 4.1 million 11 million 
AIG Capital v Kazakhstan USA C Extra-large 6 million 9.3 million 
Petrobart v Kyrgyzstan No 2 Gibraltar (FS: 
DU) 
C Unknown 1.1 million 1.5 million 
Sistem Muhendislik v 
Kyrgyzstan 
Turkey (FS: DU) C Unknown 8.5 million 10 million 
Nykomb v Latvia Sweden C Large 3 million 3.2 million 
Swembalt v Latvia Sweden (FS: 
DU) 
C Unknown 2.5 million 2.8 million 
Feldman v Mexico USA N Other individual 1.7 million 1.7 million 
Gemplus v Mexico France C Extra-large 4.5 million 6.4 million 
Tecmed v Mexico Spain C Extra-large 5.5 million 7.4 million 
Talsud v Mexico Argentina C Small 6 million 9 million 
Arif v Moldova France N Other individual 2.8 million 2.8 million 
Saar Papier v Poland Germany (FS: 
DU) 
C Unknown 1.6 million 2.2 million 
Awdi v Romania USA N Super wealthy 
individual 
8.6 million 12 million 
Renta 4 v Russia Spain C Large 2 million 2.8 million 
RosInvestCo v Russia UK (FS: DU) C Small 3.5 million 3.9 million 
Sedelmayer v Russia Germany N Other individual 2.4 million 2.8 million 
PSEG v Turkey USA C Large 9 million 15 million 
Alpha Projektholding v Ukraine Austria N Other individual 3 million 8 million 
Lemire v Ukraine No 2 USA N Other individual 8.7 million 8.7 million 
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Pope & Talbot v Canada USA C Medium 460000 460000 
Mitchell v Congo USA N Other individual 750000 1.1 million 
Swisslion v Macedonia Switzerland (FS: 
Serbia) 
C Medium 440000 490000 
Bogdanov v Moldova No 1 Russia N Other individual 280000 280000 
Bogdanov v Moldova No 2 Russia N Other individual 160000 data unavailable 
(DU) 
Tza Yap Shum v Peru China N Other individual 790000 1 million 
Maffezini v Spain Argentina N Other individual 410000 490000 
AAPL v Sri Lanka UK (FS DU) C Unknown 460000 610000 
Fedax v Venezuela Netherlands (FS 
DU) 
C Unknown 600000 760000 
      
Nordzucker v Poland Germany C Large 0 0 
Rompetrol v Romania Netherlands 
(FS: Romania) 
C Large 0 0 
Al-Bahloul v Tajikistan Austria N Other individual 0 0 
Biwater v Tanzania UK C Unknown 0 0 
      
Total: 86 cases  
 
 
  C: 61 
N: 25 
X-large: 26 
Large: 14 
Medium: 4 
Small: 4 
Unknown: 13 
Super wealthy 
individual: 5 
Other 
individual: 20 
Total: 7191 
million  
 
 
Total: 9164 
million  
 
 
 
3. The Yukos cases 
As noted in the appendix, three Yukos cases that led to a combined award of USD50 
billion are reported separately from the above data due to the sheer size of the overall 
order of compensation and to assist the reader in drawing his or her own conclusions. 
For our part, we classified these cases – arising claims by the companies Yukos Universal 
Limited (YUL), Hulley Enterprises Limited (Hulley), and Veteran Petroleum Trust – as 
cases brought by a super wealthy individual, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, on the following 
basis.4 
In 1997, several Russian businessmen including Mr. Khodorkovsky registered an off-
shore company in Gibraltar called Flaymon Limited, which was soon after re-named 
Group MENATEP Limited (MENATEP). When the relevant ISDS claims were filed, the 
share capital of MENATEP was distributed among Khodorkovsky (9.5%), Leonid Nevzlin 
(8%), Mikhail Brudno (7%), Platon Lebedev (7%), Vladimir Dubov (7%), Vasily 
Shakhnovsky (7%), and others (4.5%).  The remaining 50% was held by a trust fund called 
                                                          
4
 The detailed research on these cases case was conducted by Malysheuski based on online sources: 
http://www.pca-cpa.org/VET-_Interim_Award_-_30_Nov_200972dc.PDF?fil_id=2721; 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_Menatep#Group_Menatep_Limited; 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Millhouse_Capital; https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Group_MENATEP; 
http://khodorkovsky.ru/media/0001-293_%5Bt.175_l.d._1-293%5D.doc 
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the Special Trust Arrangement, the sole beneficiary of which was Khodorkovsky. In 
effect, Khodorkovsky directly and indirectly owned 59.5% of MENATEP. MENATEP 
owned in turn 100% of the shares of YUL, another off-shore company registered in the 
Isle of Man. YUL in turn owned 100% of the shares of Hulley, an off-shore company 
registered in Cyprus that owned 57.47% of the shares of Joint Stock Company "NC" 
Yukos (another 3.54% of this company was owned by YUL directly).  YUL also had 
another 100%-owned Cyprus-registered subsidiary, Veteran Petroleum Ltd (VPL). At the 
time of the Yukos bankruptcy in 2005, MENATEP controlled 51% of Yukos shares 
through YUL and Hulley and an additional 10% through Veteran Petroleum Trust (a trust 
established by VPL under the laws of the state of Jersey).5 Effectively, a group of six 
Russian oligarchs including Khodorkovsky controlled 62% of Yukos through the off-shore 
vehicles YUL, Hulley, and VPL at the material times.6 By his ownership of the largest 
stake, we considered Khodorkovsky, in objective terms, to be the directing or 
influencing mind in the Yukos group of entities. 
Incidentally, these cases appear to be examples of forum-shopping whereby individuals 
were allowed to bring ISDS claims against their own state by using companies or other 
entities abroad. Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, and Shakhnovsky are Russian citizens; Brudno, 
Nevzlin, and Dubov acquired Israeli citizenship in addition to their Russian citizenship 
after leaving Russia for Israel in 2003, after criminal proceedings were brought against 
them in Russia. 
In any event, due to their size, the three Yukos awards were distinct from the others in 
the dataset and so have been reported separately. The exclusion of these cases reduced 
vastly – from 89% to 12.6% (or from 86.3% to 11.7% including pre-award interest) – the 
proportion of the total compensation that was ordered for super wealthy individuals. 
Case Claimant 
nationality (with 
apparent forum 
shopping (FS) 
indicated) 
Corporation 
or natural 
person 
Claimant 
size or 
wealth 
Amount awarded Amount awarded + 
pre-award interest 
Hulley v Russia Cyprus (FS: Russia) N Super 
wealthy 
individual 
39972 million 39972 million 
                                                          
5
 In the case of VPL, a Swiss court found that Khodorkovsky, Lebedev, Golubovitch, Nevzlin, Doubov, Brudno and 
Chakhnovski were the beneficial owners of the totality of Yukos shares allegedly owned or controlled by VPL; 
Veteran Petroleum Limited (Cyprus) v. Russian Federation, PCA Case No. AA 228 (Interim Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility, 30 November 2009), para. 71 (E-43) and 420. 
6
 Another 8.8% of Yukos was controlled by Roman Abramovich, another Russian oligarch, through his United 
Kingdom vehicle Millhouse Capital. The remaining approximately 39% of Yukos stock was held by various hedge 
funds, American Depository Receipts (ADRs), and minor shareholders. 
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Veteran Petroleum v 
Russia 
Cyprus (FS: Russia) N Super 
wealthy 
individual 
8203 million 8203 million 
Yukos v Russia Isle of Man (FS: 
Russia) 
N Super 
wealthy 
individual 
1846 million 1846 million 
 
4. Apparent forum-shopping 
The investigation of ultimate ownership of ISDS claimants brought to light some cases of 
apparent forum-shopping. The concept of forum-shopping here included situations 
where the historical base or nationality of the ultimate owner in a claimant group 
differed from that of the opposite state under the relevant treaty used for the ISDS 
claim. 
The primary finding was that this forum-shopping had a major effect for U.S. 
beneficiaries; the ordered compensation increased by 70% after accounting for the 
forum-shopping. It also had a major effect for Netherlands’ beneficiaries, leading to a 
decrease of 98%. In turn, the ordered compensation for U.S. beneficiaries rose from a 
minority (39%) to a majority (66%) of the overall total. Accounting for this forum-
shopping also modestly increased the ordered compensation for UK, German, or (in a 
case with very little awarded) Serbian beneficiaries and modestly decreased it for 
Turkish or, for the tiny award to a Serbian beneficiary, Swiss beneficiaries. 
The following table indicates the ordered transfers by country, with and without 
apparent forum-shopping. It also includes notes on our incidental findings on forum-
shopping including a note of those situations where there was apparent forum-shopping 
but data was unavailable on ultimate ownership of the ISDS claim. 
Country of 
ISDS claim 
No. of cases No. of cases 
accounting for 
apparent 
forum-
shopping 
Amount 
awarded 
Amount 
awarded 
accounting for 
apparent FS 
Amount including 
pre-award interest  
Amount including 
pre-award 
interest 
accounting for 
apparent FS 
USA  25.5 
(one shared 
with UK) 
28.5 
 
2785 million 4701 million 3591 million 6113 million 
Netherlands 
 
7 2 
(includes one 
FS: data 
unavailable 
(DU)) 
1946 million  40 million 2551 million 54 million 
Germany  
 
 
7 7.5 
(includes one 
FS: DU) 
346 million  363.5 million 407 million 424.5 million 
UK  6.5 
(one shared 
with USA) 
7.5 cases 
(two FS cases 
shared with 
251 million 331 million 314 million 414 million  
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Germany and 
Turkey) 
(includes 2 FS: 
DU) 
France 
 
5.5 
(one shared 
with Belgium) 
5.5 625 million  NA 746 million NA 
Spain  4 4 58 million NA 66 million NA 
Italy 
 
3 3 
(includes major 
award where 
claimant was 
dual national, 
not classified as 
FS)  
102 million NA 168 million NA 
Sweden 
 
3 3 
(includes one 
FS: DU) 
122 million NA 162 million NA 
Belgium 
 
2.5 
(one shared 
with France) 
2.5 72 million NA 108 million  NA 
Argentina 
 
2 2 7 million NA 10 million NA 
Austria 
 
2 2 3 million NA 8 million NA 
Greece 
 
2 2 
(includes one 
FS: DU) 
17 million NA 49 million NA 
Switzerland 
 
2 1 39 million  39 million 65 million 64 million 
Turkey 
 
2 1.5 
(one shared 
with UK) 
134 million 71 million 175 million 92.5 million 
Australia 
 
1 1 
(includes 1 FS: 
DU) 
4.1 million NA 11 million NA 
Barbados 
 
1 0 46 million 0 60 million 0 
China 
 
1 1 0.8 million NA 1 million NA 
Cyprus 
 
1 1 
(includes 1 FS: 
DU) 
76 million NA 76 million NA 
Finland 
 
1 1 11 million NA 14 million NA 
Gibraltar 
 
1 1 
(includes 1 FS: 
DU) 
1.1 million NA 1.5 million NA 
Israel 
 
1 1 15 million NA 45 million NA 
Malaysia 
 
1 1 6 million NA 7 million NA 
Moldova 
 
1 1 498 million NA 498 million NA 
Oman 
 
1 1 25 million NA 35 million NA 
Russia 
 
2 2 0.4 million NA 0.4 million NA 
Romania 0 1 NA 0 NA 0 
Serbia 0 1 NA 0.4 million NA 0.5 million 
 
B. Legal outcomes by size or wealth of ISDS beneficiary 
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We also compared legal outcomes in ISDS cases, at the jurisdictional, merits, and 
combined stages of a case, to the size or wealth of claimants. The findings are outlined 
below. 
 
Keeping in mind that these are descriptive statistics, the only noteworthy findings 
appears to be the higher success rate of extra-large companies: 70.8% combined over 
48 cases with a confirmed adjudicative resolution at the jurisdictional and/ or the merits 
stage. In contrast, the success rate of other claimants was 42.2% combined over 166 
cases. However, the success rates of large (as opposed to extra-large) companies (44.7% 
over 38 cases) and of super wealthy individuals (36.4% over 22 cases) was comparable 
to those of other claimants not including large or extra-large companies or super 
wealthy individuals (42.5% over 106 cases). 
 
In particular, the success rate of extra-large companies at the merits stage (82.9% over 
41 cases) was much higher than that of other claimants (57.9% over 121 cases). 
 
Claimant 
size or 
wealth 
Cases 
coded for 
size or 
wealth 
Cases with 
confirmed 
adjudicative 
resolution  
Outcome: 
jurisdiction 
not found 
Outcome: 
jurisdiction 
found 
Success 
rate: 
jurisdiction 
Outcome: 
violation 
not found 
Outcome: 
violation 
found 
Success 
rate: 
merits 
Overall 
success 
rate 
Extra-
large 
company 
70 
 
48 7 54 88.5% 7 34 82.9% 70.8% 
Large 
company 
54 38 9 39 81.3% 12 17 58.6% 44.7% 
Medium 
company 
18 9 1 16 94.1% 3 5 62.5% 55.6% 
Small 
company 
16 11 3 10 76.9% 3 5 62.5% 45.5% 
Unknown 
company 
48 41 11 31 73.8% 16 14 46.7% 34.1% 
Super 
wealthy 
individual 
26 22 8 15 65.2% 6 8 57.1% 36.4% 
Other 
individual 
57 45 13 37 74.0% 11 21 65.6% 46.7% 
 292 214 52 201 79.5% 58 104 64.2% 48.6% 
 
C. Size or wealth of claimants and ordered financial transfers compared to ISDS 
costs 
 
We also compared the data on ordered compensation, classified by claimant size or 
wealth, to approximate legal and arbitration costs in ISDS. The estimate of costs per 
case was taken from an OECD survey that reported an average of USD8 million in ISDS 
legal and arbitration costs per case for both sides, with some cases exceeding USD30 
million in costs.7  
                                                          
7
 D. Gaukrodger and K. Gordon, “Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping Paper for the Investment Policy 
Community”, OECD Working Paper on International Investment No. 2012/03 (OECD, 2012), 19. The OECD analysis 
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These estimated costs are approximate because of a lack of detailed public information 
on costs in ISDS awards. Also, the use of averages may skew the numbers in individual 
cases if costs are higher in cases brought, for example, by larger or wealthier actors. As 
discussed in the appendix to this paper, tracking of ISDS costs and ordered 
compensation also does not cover all potential costs and benefits of ISDS. 
 
The estimates do not account for cost shifting, which sometimes occurs in ISDS cases. 
However, on this point, in 196 cases with the relevant data, cost shifting appeared on 
average per case to have favoured respondent states for nearly all categories of 
claimant size/ wealth. The clear exception was extra-large companies, which paid one 
third of the costs on average per case where cost shifting occurred).8 
 
Despite these limitations, the estimates are useful in evaluating tentatively whether the 
financial position of small or medium companies or non-super wealthy individuals 
appears to have been improved due to ISDS, not only compared to larger or wealthier 
investors, but also in absolute terms. That is, the estimate of average ISDS costs – taken 
here to be USD4 million per case for the claimant investor(s) – suggests that a large 
majority of these smaller investors (82%) spent more on ISDS costs than they received in 
ordered transfers. 
 
The approximate data on aggregate ordered compensation, accounting for assumed 
ISDS costs, is outlined below. 
 
Claimant size 
or wealth 
Measure of 
size or 
wealth 
Cases with 
confirmed 
adjudicative 
resolution  
Cases where 
received 
damages 
Total 
awarded, raw 
sum only 
Total 
awarded, 
raw sum 
plus pre-
award 
interest 
Total 
estimated 
ISDS legal 
and 
arbitration 
costs 
Net gain/ 
loss 
Extra-large 
company 
>$10 
billion in 
annual 
revenue 
48 26 
 
5282 million  
 
6718 million 
 
 
192 million +6526 
million 
Large 
company 
>$1 billion 
and <$10 
billion in 
annual 
38 14 601 million 780 million  
 
 
152 million +628 
million 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
covered 143 available ISDS awards of which 28 provided information on arbitral fees and legal expenses, 81 
provided some information on costs, and 62 provided no such information.  
8
 Of the 292 cases with information on claimant size, costs were found to have been shifted in 77 of 198 cases with 
available data, of which 25 cases were brought by a small or medium company or a non-super wealthy individual 
(with average cost shifting per case of 57.8% allocated to the claimant and 42.2% to the respondent) and 14 cases 
by an unknown company (57.6% to the claimant). These portions of shifted cost borne by claimants were modestly 
lower than in cases brought by large companies (67.8% to the claimant in 14 cases) and tycoons (62.5% to the 
claimant in 10 cases) and substantially higher than in cases brought by extra-large companies (33.4% to the 
claimant in 14 cases). 
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revenue 
Medium 
company 
>$100  
million and 
<$1 billion 
in annual 
revenue  
9 4 13 million 
 
17 million  
 
 
36 million -19 million 
Small 
company 
<$100 
million in 
annual 
revenue 
11 4 80 million 
 
 
99 million  
 
 
44 million +55 million 
Unknown 
company 
data 
unavailable 
(DU) for 
annual 
revenue 
41 13 132 million  
 
154 million 164 million -10 million 
Super wealthy 
individual 
>$100 
million in 
net wealth 
22 5 905 million 
 
1072 million  
 
88 million +984 
million 
Other 
individual 
<$100 
million in 
net wealth 
45 20 179 million 
 
325 million 180 million +145 
million 
 
Within this grouping of smaller enterprises, the tentative analysis suggested that a net 
loss in ISDS cases for medium companies was outweighed by a net gain for small 
companies and non-super wealthy individuals. For companies with unknown annual 
revenues, it appeared that there was a net loss 
 
The overall gain for smaller enterprises appeared to be concentrated in a fairly small 
minority of beneficiaries. At the case level, a net gain was apparent in 12 (18.5%) of 65 
cases with a confirmed adjudicative resolution and not involving an extra-large or large 
company, an unknown company, or a super wealthy individual. If one included unknown 
companies in the grouping, a net gain appeared in 18 (17%) of 106 cases. These were 
the cases in which the smaller or unknown investor received an ordered transfer 
exceeding the assumed average of USD4 million in ISDS legal and arbitration costs. 
These 18 cases are listed below. 
 
Case Claimant 
nationality (with 
apparent forum 
shopping 
indicated) 
Claimant size or 
wealth 
Amount awarded Amount plus pre-
award interest 
where available 
Siag v Egypt Italy (FS: dual 
national of Egypt) 
Other individual 75 million 129 million 
ADC v Hungary Cyprus (FS: data 
unavailable (DU)) 
Unknown 76 million 76 million 
Guaracachi v Bolivia UK, USA Small 29 million 36 million 
Pey Casado v Chile Spain Other individual 
(and non-profit 
org) 
10 million 14 million 
Kardassapoulos v Georgia Greece Other individual 15 million 45 million 
Fuchs v Georgia Israel Other individual 15 million 45 million 
Metalclad v Mexico USA (FS: DU) Unknown 17 million 17 million 
Walter Bau v Thailand Germany Small 41 million 50 million 
Desert Line Products v 
Yemen 
Oman Other individual 25 million 30 million 
Funnekotter v Zim Netherlands Other individual 11 million 25 million 
 12 
 
American Manufacturing 
v Congo 
USA (FS: DU) Unknown 9 million 9 million 
Reinhard Unglaube v 
Costa Rica 
Germany Other individual 3.1 million 4.1 million 
Wena Hotels v Egypt UK (FS: DU) Unknown 8.8 million 19 million 
White Industries v India Australia (FS: DU) Unknown 4.1 million 11 million 
Sistem Muhendislik v 
Kyrgyzstan 
Turkey (FS: DU) Unknown 8.5 million 10 million 
Talsud v Mexico Argentina Small 6 million 9 million 
Alpha Projektholding v 
Ukraine 
Austria Other individual 3 million 8 million 
Lemire v Ukraine No 2 USA Other individual 8.7 million 8.7 million 
 
Therefore, from this tentative and limited perspective, ISDS appears to have created 
among smaller and unknown investors a small number of lucky winners and a much 
larger number of apparent losers. 
 
The data on ISDS costs also highlights financial benefits of ISDS for ISDS lawyers, 
arbitrators, experts, and other actors who earn income from ISDS fees. In 214 ISDS cases 
with a confirmed adjudicative resolution, based on the OECD estimate of ISDS costs the 
total payments of fees from disputing parties to the ISDS industry would have been 
about USD1.7 billion.  
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this article was to assess claims about ISDS linked to the size and wealth 
of foreign investors who bring claims and obtain orders of compensation in their favour. 
Broadly, ISDS was approached as a system that generates financial transfers, with a 
focused on ordered compensation by first-instance tribunals. The findings on the 
apparent transfers can be summarized as follows (all figures in USD): 
 
From states to extra-large9 companies:  6718 million in 48 cases 
From states to super wealthy individuals10: 1072 million in 22 cases 
From states to large11 companies:  780 million in 38 cases 
From states to other individuals12:  325 million in 45 cases 
From states to other13 companies:  270 million in 61 cases 
Total from states to foreign investors:  9164 million in 214 cases 
 
From states to ISDS industry:14    856 million 
From other companies to ISDS industry:  244 million 
                                                          
9
 Over USD10 billion in annual revenue. 
10
 Over USD100 million in net wealth. 
11
 Over USD1 billion in annual revenue, less than USD10 billion. 
12
 Under USD100 million in net wealth. Includes both confirmed and apparent non-super wealthy individuals. 
13
 Over USD100 million in annual revenue, less than USD1 billion. Includes companies for which annual revenues 
were unknown. 
14
 Primarily lawyers and arbitrators but also including paid experts and arbitral institutions. 
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From extra-large companies to ISDS industry:  192 million 
From other individuals to ISDS industry:  180 million 
From large companies to ISDS industry:   152 million  
From super wealthy individuals to ISDS industry: 88 million 
Total from disputing parties to ISDS industry:  1700 million in 214 cases 
  
From the same perspective, net winners and losers in the aggregate emerged as follows: 
 
Big winners 
Extra-large companies:    6526 million (136 million per adjudicated case) 
ISDS industry:     1712 million (8 million) 
Super wealthy individuals:   984 million (45 million) 
Large companies:    628 million (17 million) 
 
Modest winners 
Other individuals:    145 million (3 million) 
Small and medium companies:    36 million (2 million) 
 
Modest losers 
Companies with unknown annual revenue: -10 million (-0.2 million) 
 
Big losers 
Respondent states:    -10020 million (-47 million) 
 
These data are not based on elaborate statistical analysis; they support descriptive 
findings about what has happened in ISDS but should not be taken as predictions of 
future outcomes. The findings may reflect coincidences and be subject to a risk of error 
that precludes predictive claims. The main contribution of our study is to show how ISDS 
has unfolded from the point of view of financial transfers based on a comprehensive 
review of known ISDS cases. The findings are perhaps most useful where they reveal 
wide variations in the experiences of different actors and where they cast doubt on 
claims about ISDS that are not based on comparable evidence. 
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Appendix: Limitations, dataset, and methodology 
 
Our research and analysis focused on aggregate ordered compensation by first-instance 
tribunals. We did not attempt to track actual records of payment of awards or account 
for changes in ordered compensation due to set aside or annulment decisions. Also, 
there are other ways to measure claimant success in ISDS. We have moved beyond an 
approach based on win-loss outcomes in ISDS litigation to a somewhat more complex 
measure based on aggregate ordered compensation. More ambitiously, one could 
assess claimant success in terms of less overt and non-financial costs and benefits, such 
as the utility of ISDS as a tool to influence regulatory-decision-making. Other forms of 
assessment would be more comprehensive but also less measurable numerically and 
more amenable, we suspect, to qualitative than quantitative tools. For these and other 
reasons discussed in the introduction to this paper and below, our research and analysis 
generates only an approximate and descriptive picture of aspects of ISDS as a system 
that leads to financial transfers. 
 
The underlying dataset for this paper included all known and publicly-available ISDS 
cases that led to a decision on jurisdiction, at least, as of spring of 2015. The most 
relevant fields in the dataset for this paper were: claimant nationality, date and 
outcome of award on jurisdiction, date and outcome of award on merits, amount 
awarded (converted to USD as of the date of the award), and damages awarded with 
and without pre-award interest (calculated, where applicable, using the interest rate 
and date range stipulated by the tribunal). Awards were not adjusted for time value of 
money because our aim was to provide simple and descriptive findings supported by 
public data where none presently exists on the issue. 
 
The underlying dataset was compiled by five law school students, most recently Ryan De 
Vries, working as research assistants over a period of seven years. Each assistant, after 
initial training, collected information on ISDS cases from publicly-available awards and 
other decisions up to the relevant time cut-off. The main source of awards and other 
decisions was italaw.com supplemented by official websites of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA), the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (SCC), and the federal governments of 
Canada, Mexico, and the United States. An award or decision had to be available on 
italaw.com and allow for verification as a treaty-based case, or the case had to be 
identified as treaty-based on one of the official websites just listed, in order for the case 
to be included in the analysis. Coding results were screened by the author (i.e. 
approximately half of the coding decisions were checked for errors) and past coding was 
checked and sometimes re-coded by another research assistant. For the data used in 
the present article, relevant coding rarely involved significant discretionary choices by 
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the coder; rather, it focused on descriptive information on ISDS cases that tended to be 
clear in the award or other decision. Considering the extent of information collected and 
the absence of a comprehensive double or triple coding process, there is a risk of 
occasional error in data entry. 
 
In a significant minority of cases in the dataset, roughly 15%, one or more of the 
relevant awards or decisions were not public. Also, there are an unknown number of 
cases that can be assumed to be completely confidential. For the dataset overall, there 
is a reasonable prospect that this confidentiality may impact the findings, especially for 
fields connected to arbitration forums and where one forum is more open than another. 
For the present analysis, in one exceptional case (Suez & Interaguas v Argentina) public 
information was available up to, but not for, a known award on damages. For this case 
only, a non-official source (Investment Arbitration Reporter) was relied on to code the 
amount awarded to the claimant.  
 
Within this ISDS case dataset, all confirmed treaty-based cases were then classified for 
size or wealth of the claimant up to the spring of 2014 (specifically, up to posting on 
italaw.com as of 18 April 2014). Co-author Pavel Malysheuski – a corporate/ commercial 
and securities lawyer with knowledge of ISDS – determined reasonable measures of the 
size and wealth of claimants and coded the cases for size and wealth of the claimant. 
Companies were classified based on their annual revenue as small (under USD100 
million in annual revenue), medium (over USD100 million, under USD1 billion) large 
(over USD1 billion), or extra-large (over USD10 billion). For individuals, those with an 
apparent net wealth of more than USD100 million were classified as super wealthy; 
those whose net wealth was not found to exceed this threshold as other individuals.15 
Annual revenue and net wealth was examined at the time of the relevant award or 
decision in the ISDS case.16 
 
This approach to classification over-stated the role of small and medium enterprises and 
non-super wealthy individuals in ISDS. The categories used to identify small and medium 
– with annual revenues under USD100 million and USD1 billion respectively – were 
much more inclusive than what other measures would consider a small or medium 
enterprise.17 Likewise, some may consider individuals who have a net wealth below 
                                                          
15
 A more sophisticated analysis would treat annual revenue and net wealth as continuous variables; the 
classifications used here were simpler to code – especially in the case of net wealth – and thought sufficient to give 
an overall picture of past financial transfers. 
16
 There were a few complicating cases, such as PacRim v El Salvador where ownership of the claim shifted from a 
small to a medium company in the course of the dispute (albeit without affecting the findings on ordered 
compensation because the case is ongoing) but for the most part the issue did not raise coding challenges. 
17
 e.g. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, OECD SME and Entrepreneurship Outlook: 2005 
(Paris: OECD), 17, citing EU definitions based on annual turnover of EUR10 million for small enterprises and EUR50 
million for medium enterprises. 
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USD100 million as still rich compared to owners of small and medium enterprises and 
other individuals. For the reasons, the findings may over-state the number of ISDS cases 
and financial transfers for small or medium-sized enterprises. 
 
Where information was unavailable on a company’s annual revenue, the company was 
classified as unknown. This separate category was used – instead of assuming, for 
example, that all such companies were small or medium – because, although some such 
companies appeared likely to be small or medium, others appeared to be potential 
holding companies where ultimate ownership could not be tracked. In contrast, where 
data was unavailable on an individual’s net wealth, it was assumed that the individual 
was not super wealthy on the assumption that an individual worth USD100 million or 
more would be identifiable as such using standard online sources. In any event, as will 
be seen below, these classification issues appeared not to impact significantly the main 
findings of the paper. 
 
Where there were multiple claimant nationalities (e.g. a claim both by a foreign 
company and by a subsidiary in the host state), the opposite nationality under the treaty 
or treaties under which the ISDS claim was brought was classified as the primary 
nationality. In a few cases, primary nationality was shared because the claim was 
brought under multiple treaties. The results of this coding allowed for incidental and 
approximate findings on apparent forum-shopping. That is, cases were noted as 
apparent forum-shopping cases where the largest or wealthiest owner of a claimant was 
based in, or (for individuals) had the nationality of, a country other than the primary 
nationality in the ISDS case. This was a loose approach to dealing with potential forum-
shopping in that it did not ask whether the company in the opposite state under the 
treaty had a substantial connection to that state or whether the ultimate owner’s 
incorporation decision in the opposite state was made with express intent to facilitate 
an ISDS claim. Instead, forum-shopping as analyzed here captured (a) situations in which 
multinationals brought an ISDS claim from a jurisdiction within their network of 
corporate nationalities that was not their historical base of operations and (b) situations 
in which a super wealthy individual acquired the nationality of the opposite state by 
incorporating in that state. As will be seen, the clearest finding on forum-shopping that 
is directly relevant to financial transfers involves U.S. large or extra-large parent 
companies or U.S. super wealthy individuals that benefited from ISDS claims made by 
corporate claimants in the Netherlands. 
 
Also for cases involving multiple claimants, each case was classified as having a single 
claimant size or wealth based on precedence for the largest or wealthiest ultimate 
owner of a claimant in the case. To illustrate, a claim both by a domestic company of the 
host state and by the foreign corporate owner of that company under the treaty, where 
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the latter was ultimately owned by an extra-large parent company in a third state, was 
classified as a claim by the extra-large parent company. Alternatively, a claim by a 
medium company owned by a super wealthy individual was classified as a claim by that 
individual. In short, cases were coded based on the largest or wealthiest actor in the 
group of both claimants and ultimate owners of claimants. Although it did not arise in 
any of the cases coded here, precedence would have been given to classification as an 
extra-large or large company rather than as a super wealthy individual. 
 
In light of these assumptions for cases involving multiple claimants, the data was 
reviewed to identify possible misrepresentations arising from situations in which 
multiple claimants of different sizes or wealth brought a claim and the case was 
classified as having been brought by the largest or wealthiest claimant in the group. In 
the great majority of such cases, the claimant group consisted of multiple companies in 
the same corporate group; multiple companies of the same size; multiple companies 
with one or more unknown companies alongside an large or extra-large company and 
apparently falling within the larger corporate group; multiple claimants with one or 
more unknown companies alongside an individual; multiple individuals including a super 
wealthy individual and one or more other individuals who were family members of or 
otherwise apparently related to the super wealthy individual; or multiple individuals 
none of whom appeared super wealthy. For all of these situations, in our view the 
coding assumptions for cases involving multiple claimants were appropriate. 
 
However, there was one case – Abengoa v Mexico – where compensation was ordered 
and the coding assumptions appeared to risk misrepresenting the results. The claim was 
brought by an extra-large and an apparently unrelated large company but was coded as 
a claim by the extra-large company. The ordered compensation in the case was USD40 
million (USD42 million including pre-award interest). We opted not to use an alternative 
coding approach – such as a 50-50 attribution of the claim between the two companies 
or attribution based on their relative size or ownership stake in the disputed assets – 
because the case had little effect on the overall findings, the alternative coding 
approaches also had an arbitrary quality, the coding assumptions did not otherwise 
appear to raise concerns about misrepresentation, and, with the present disclosure, 
readers are able to evaluate and adjust the findings as they see fit. 
 
Overall, the dataset had 292 cases coded for claimant size or wealth as of the spring of 
2014 with data on outcomes, including amounts awarded, up to the spring of 2015.18 Of 
                                                          
18
 Three cases were coded as NA (not applicable) for claimant size or wealth because it was difficult to identify a 
corporate or individual claimant based on the coding assumptions. They included cases brought by a state entity 
(Kaliningrad v Lithuania), a series of irrigation districts and individuals (Bayview Irrigation v Mexico), and a series of 
natural and juridical persons (CCFT v USA). None of these cases led to a damages award; the first lacked public 
information and the other two were dismissed at the jurisdictional stage.  
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these 292 cases, 253 were coded as having a jurisdictional outcome, i.e. a verifiable 
decision of the tribunal finding or not finding jurisdiction (other cases typically were 
ongoing or resolved before a jurisdictional outcome). Of these 253 cases, the tribunal 
declined jurisdiction in 52 cases and accepted jurisdiction in 201. Of these 201 cases, the 
tribunal did not find a violation of the treaty in 58 cases and found a violation in 162 
(again, other cases typically were ongoing or had settled before a merits decision). Of 
these 162 cases, there were 89 in which an amount was confirmed to have been 
awarded (in four of these cases the amount was zero). Three of these 89 cases – the 
Yukos cases totalling USD50 billion in ordered compensation – swamped the other 
results and were relatively challenging to code for size or wealth of the claimant. For 
these reasons, these cases were presented separately in the paper. The remaining 86 
cases constitute the dataset analyzed for ordered compensation due to ISDS.  
 
Notably, two cases that led to awards were excluded from the 86 cases. CSOB v Slovakia 
was excluded because it was classified as a contract-based case although it fell close to 
the line and is arguably a contract-treaty hybrid. ATA v Jordan was also excluded 
because it led to the remedy of an order that another arbitration could go ahead and so 
was difficult to quantify in terms of monetary value. Both cases involved claims by a 
large or extra-large company. For the record, I have provided the relevant data on the 
two excluded cases below. The main impact of the exclusion of these cases was to 
reduce the share of aggregate ordered compensation for extra-large companies from 
76.8% (76.1% including pre-award interest) to 73.5% (73.3%). 
 
Case Claimant nationality 
(with apparent 
forum shopping (FS) 
indicated) 
Corporation 
or natural 
person 
Claimant size 
or wealth 
Amount awarded Amount awarded + 
pre-award interest 
where available 
CSOB v Slovakia  Czech Republic (FS: 
Belgium) 
C Extra-large 1050 million 1050 million 
ATA v Jordan Turkey C Large NA – non monetary 
order that other 
arbitration can 
proceed 
NA – non monetary 
order that other 
arbitration can 
proceed 
 
For the main analysis for this paper, ordered compensation at first-instance (i.e. not 
including set aside or annulment decisions) was compared to claimant size and wealth in 
all cases to the spring of 2014. Legal outcomes at the jurisdictional, merits, and 
combined stages of ISDS cases were also compared to claimant size and wealth. Finally, 
ordered compensation was compared to average ISDS costs for the disputing parties as 
estimated by other researchers.19 Findings on apparent forum-shopping were recorded 
incidentally, as discussed above. 
 
                                                          
19
 Gaukrodger and Gordon, above n 7. 
